United States principles of war (Refer to US Army Field Manual FM 3–0)
- Objective – Direct
every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable
objective. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the
enemy's ability to fight and will to fight.
- Offensive – Seize, retain, and exploit
the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to
attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the
means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while
maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. This is
fundamentally true across all levels of war.
- Mass – Mass the effects of
overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. Synchronizing
all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on
an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass. Massing
effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior
forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire.
- Economy of Force –
Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible;
allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of
force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of
the force should ever be left without purpose. The allocation of available
combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception,
or even retrograde operations is measured in order to achieve mass
elsewhere at the decisive point and time on the battlefield. ...
- Maneuver – Place the enemy in a
position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain
positional advantage. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and
protects the force. It is used to exploit successes, to preserve freedom
of action, and to reduce vulnerability. It continually poses new problems
for the enemy by rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to
defeat. ...
- Unity of Command –
For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. At all
levels of war, employment of military forces in a manner that masses
combat power toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces are
under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the
requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose.
- Security – Never permit the enemy to
acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by
reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security
results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces.
Knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, doctrine, and
staff planning improve the detailed planning of adequate security
measures.
- Surprise – Strike the enemy at a time
or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise can
decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces
can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended.
Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of main
effort, and timing. Deception can aid the probability of achieving
surprise.
- Simplicity – Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and
concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very
simple, but the simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military
operations are not difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful
operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize
misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, parsimony is to
be preferred.
Officers in the
U.S. Military sometimes use the acronyms "MOSS COMES", "MOSS
MOUSE", "MOOSE MUSS", "MOUSE MOSS", "MOM USE
SOS", or "SUMO MOSES" to remember the first letters of these
nine principles.
There is a
debate within the American military establishment to adopt flexibility as the
tenth principle of war. Frost[7] argues that the concept of flexibility
should be integrated with America's warfighting doctrine. Americans
soundly retort that flexibility is a given that pervades all aspects of each
principle.
Many, however,
hold that the principle of Simplicity implicitly includes flexibility. One of
the oldest dicta states that the simple plan is the flexible plan.
But, in the Vicksburg
Campaign, conducted over basically a year and a half U.S. Grant out-thought,
out-maneuvered, out-boasted, out-lasted, and possibly out-prayed, our nations
proud southern confederate fighting rebel heroes. They were unfortunately trying
to separate themselves and some of the rest of us from our northern friends and
start out all over again in a brand new country.
1)
Grant’s
adherence to the principle of Objective
in the Vicksburg campaign. He and Lincoln both held up Vicksburg as a key
objective of the overall war over several years time, in spite of being
outmaneuvered at first in North Mississippi by confederate cavalry during his
first attempts to move south from
Memphis on an overland route to take the city. Then again, when he sent
Sherman down the river to launch an attack from the north of the city the Union
troops were defeated in several locations, probably most significantly at the
battle of Chickasaw bayou where the Confederate Stephen Lee used the high
bluffs north of the city there in the terrain to help Fortress Vicksburg live
up to its name up to that point and time. After this the only sensible options
left to him were to try and move troops across Louisiania overland from north
amphibiously with the help of heavly artillery counterfire from the union
ironcalds south and below the city along the river. Even, after he had landed
below Grand Gulf, Grant still had the option (and was advised to take this
course by his superiors and fellow Generals) to be more cautious and move on
Baton Rouge first.
2)
But, Grant decided to stay the course to
defeated the eliminated the threat at Vicksburg which all agreed was key to the
continuation of the Confederacy western supply lines through the railroad
there.
By doing this he used the 2nd main principle in the U.S.
Army’s doctrine of fighting wars:
The Offensive – Seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative.
3) And,
by taking this course, and massing a huge army in order to do it he
introduced two other key principles to
our U.S. doctrine, the principle of Mass
and Manuever.
4) Manuever. – Place the enemy in
a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
To be sure other Generals had already used the
principle of Mass in earlier battles of the war, but not to such great effect,
because they did not combine their massing of troops by applying the mass of
troops
At a critical and decisive turning point in the strategy of maneuver of
forces as Clauswitz was already preaching from his experience in European wars.
Application of force and mass this way was again to be re-discovered in our
last U.S. century by General Schwarzkopf in the first Persian Gulf War against Saddam
Husein. General Schwarzkopf, referring
to his own Army War College training and other Post-Vietnam U.S. Army training
and doctrine studies as ‘the operational art’.
During the Vietnam war the U.S. Army unfortunately reverted to the civil
war doctrine of applying overwhelming ‘firepower’ and other means of enemy
attrition (such as bombing and and airpower) to be the decisive factor in the
overall strategy of the war. This approach, which was still tried to be used as
a deterrent of force arrangement for peacetime deterrence in the early 1970s by
us in the US. It had failed us in Vietnam as a decisive factor along with a
village pacification strategy to defeat the enemy. The Vietcong were able to
resupply their forces in South Vietnam along the Ho-Chi Minh trail even though
being attacked by behind the lines reconnaissance ranger land forces and bombed
heavily from the air by B-52 based in Thailand and elsewhere. In the 1970s the
Soviet’s used their advantage in numbers on the ground of several levels of
T-72 tanks lined up against us across the inter-German border to neutralize the
effect of General Starry’s and General Saint’s mobile battle-position
deployment of attrition defensive forces.
The question, in conducting the war-games came down to whether the U.S.
Engineer forces deployment of obstacles
would be able to slow the waves of attacking forces in the Fulda Gap before
they reached Frankfurt in 90 days and presented NATO with a fait-de-accomplii
leaving NATO with the only option of a tactical nuclear conflagration followed
by a conventional allied counterattack re-inforced with more tanks from the
US. The word was (from intelligence
sources) that Yuri Andropov was calculating that he could do this and NATO
wouldn’t respond with ICBM’s because of our rightedly held fear of what another
world war would do to human kind. After all, he had already done this in
Czechsovakia. This was why the Reagan administration choose to up the anti-by
introducing mobile missiles on the European continent. Looking back on it, it
seems a wise move to me.
But, what does this all have to do with the principles
of war and Grant’s campaign at Vicksburg. Well, Grant, when he decided to move
strategically, with haste and speed in order to strike a decisive blow against
the South was gambling the ‘operational art’ of maneuver as he understood it
would be a more important factor that the balance of power of ‘attitrition’ in
the scale of how the principles of war as he understood them were to be best
applied at that time, in this place where I live (Vicksburg, MS) against
Jefferson Davis and Pemberton.
On May 12 Pemberton moved his
headquarters for battle to Bovina (a small town east of Vicksburg and west of
the Big Black). He left 2 divisions at Vicksburg. On May 14 the confederate
generals under Pemberton, Bowen and Loring moved to Edwards and and just south
of there with 20,000 men. Pemberton’s engineer Lockett helped the troops set up
positions at Bowers ridge. During this time
(contrary to what he wrote in his memoirs) Grant had several hundred supply
wagons, which had come up the old Natchez Trace road, from Grand Gulf, moving
around the Raymond area.
And, Grant had McPherson’s
three divisions at Bolton ( a small town on the other side of the Big
Black on the Vicksburg Jackson road).
Figure 4 After overpowering the forces of the
confederate General Pemberton (Col. Bragg's Brigade) and General Johnson's
troops at Jackson, Grant was free to move to the west toward Vicksburg. After
the battle of Jackson there comes a critical decision point for Grant when he
has to determine whether to cover his movements to the west and Vicksburg with
forces deployed to deal with the remnants of Confederate General Johnson’s
troops attacking from the North. There is a very interesting account of Grant
son Fred about how his father was awakened by someone at 3 AM before the
movements the next day that advised him that Gen. Johnson had determined to
pull back to the north and should not be much of a factor from this part of the
battle area. After the war if was generally admitted that this was a Union spy
who gave this information to Grant. But, who was it? Was it the confederate officer on Pemberton’s
staff delivering messages to Johnson from Vicksburg. Grant does not tell us the
details of this in his memoirs. But, he does before talking about this part of
the campaign hint at someone cashiered, in a court martial earlier in Memphis
before the movement south. Gen. Johnson in his report of the events of the
battle (May 23-July5, listed in Guide to the Vicksburg Campaign by Fullenkamp
and all, pg. 343) mentions the name of a Lt. Saunders as being this confederate
officer. Ed Bearrs lists his name as Lt. E.D. Saunders in the index to his
volume III of the Vicksburg campaign where his name comes up as a Union messenger from Sherman to Stephen Lee during
the Battle of Chickasaw Bayou which occurred earlier in the Vicksburg campaign.
If this Union officer went over to the Confederates after being cashiered from
Grant’s army in Memphis he would have been serving under Grant’s chief of spies
for the Vicksburg Campaign Grenville Dodge (who operated out of Decatur GA).
Dodge located himself there because it was a railroad communication
headquarters at the time and many of the Union spies were workers in railroad
offices. The information from these
railroad spies helped Grant learn the details and times of Johnson’s troop
movement to reinforce Jackson. Captain E. D. Saunders is listed from a google
search on the internet as being killed June 2 1864 in a battle near Dallas
GA. Is it possible this Lt. E.D.
Saunders was this union spy who played such an important role in providing
Grant with crucial information about Johnson’s movements the night before this
key battle in the U.S. Civil War?
Figure 5 The
Champion Hill battle site area called the ‘Crossroads’ where the confederate
forces attacked the Unions to the East. It is located west of Champions Hill at
Latitude 32 degrees 19 minutes north, Longitude 90 degrees 32 minutes west.
All of these aerial photos were taken from the Crosswinds
Flying Club Cessna 192 9881E based at the local Vicksburg/Raymond area John
Bell Williams airport just to the east of the battle site.
Figure 6 Looking
west flying over Hwy 80 and the Champion House location.
Figure 7 Present day
farm structures on the Raymond Edwards road where the confederate forces were
set up to attack the Unions to the east on Champion Hill. Latitude 32 degrees
20 minutes north, Longitude 90 degrees 31 minutes west.
On May 16 the main battle of Champion Hill begins. Loring,
instead of helping Pemberton from the south, makes a wrong turn on a farm road
and decides to go south to Crystal Springs and then turn north up to Jackson.
This was a serious mistake with bad consequences for the Confederates. BG Tighman
however, distinguished himself in the battle by standing his ground under fire at
the Jackson creek bridge and making the ultimate sacrifice.
During the battle of Champion Hill (like that of Raymond),
Pemberton did not have his cavalry deployed properly. The two armies, Union and
Confederate, ran into each other. After the battle the confederate retreat has
to depend on building two bridges that should have already been constructed.
Figure 8 3000' photo
taking while flying back toward Raymond MS from Edwards over the Lower Baker's
creek bridge battle site.
Figure 9 Photo of
the old Jackson Vicksburg road (HWY 80) looking west toward the town of
Edwards. This area is northwest of the Champion Hill battle area.
Figure 10
Flying parallel to current Interstate I-20 over the old Jackson Vicksburg road
toward Edwards above what was the bridge over Baker's creek then. Latitude 32
degrees 20 minutes north, Longitude 90 degrees 3 minutes west.
Figure 11
Gen. Parker Hills map of the Champion Hill Battle
Figure 12
Present day site of Champion's Hill. Since 1910, it is just a rock quarry now
in the upper left of the photograph. But, as seen from the air it is definitely
the high ground that dominates the military topography of the area.
Figure 13
Location of Confederate General A. J. Smith's
Division set up to attack to the west from the east of Champion Hill near
Raymond on the Raymond Bolton road. Latitude 32 degrees 20 minutes north, 90
degrees 26 minutes west
Figure 14
Photo taken flying over the Raymond Bolton road, east of Champion Hill where
the Union General McClernand's division was one of three Union divisions deployed
to attack the hill. Latitude 32 degrees 180 minutes north, Longitude 90 degrees
28 minutes west.
Figure 15
Photo taken looking to the north on the Raymond Bolton road , just south of
which Union General McPherson’s division was deployed to attack Champion’s Hill to the west. Latitude 32 degrees 200 minutes north,
Longitude 90 degrees 28 minutes west.
Figure 16
Next three photographs show Gen. Hill's presentation of the details of Grant's
movement during the sequence of the Raymond, Jackson, Champion Hill battles.
His finger is pointed to Raymond MS on the map. The three X’s at the top are
the outnumbered Confederate Gregg’s brigade moving to intercept Grant’s large
force moving on Jackson. Besides having a much larger number of troops deployed
than Gregg expected, Grant was helped by Pemberton’s confusing orders that he
sent to Gregg. Gregg did not know from
the orders whether Pemberton wanted him to move to Bolton and Clinton first before
Raymond on not.
Figure 17
Gen. Hill and I were both students over several years of Warren Grabeau. In the
middle 1960s, a group about five us boys and girls went to his three evenings a
week Science Seminar discussions at Waterways. This was when I was in H.V.
Cooper high school at Vicksburg. Warren was not a practicing physicist with a
degree but he had some very strongly held philosophical views about the
necessity for high-school physics books to ‘define their terms”. This philosophical approach, although Warren
didn’t know it at the time, goes back to Blaise Pascal. See some earlier http://www.ourprayergroup.blogspot.com posting for more discussions on our amateur
theological hero Pascal and why it is necessary, as he said, “to give
definition to the defined”. I don't
remember meeting Mr. Bearrs although I took piano lessons from his wife Majorie
for about a year in the late 1950s.
After the defeat at Champion Hill, the three Union Corps
started their move on Vicksburg. Sherman built pontoon bridge at
Bridgeport. McPherson marched behind
Sherman. McClernand led the other Corps and used trees to cross the Big Black.
Figure 18 Tour Stop 1: Looking across recently cleared
fields, toward the Louisiana monument from De'Goyer's battery
Figure 19 Looking from the high point of the Illinois
monument southeast across open fields of fire toward, the union lines and their
approach from the Union DeGoyer’s Battery toward the west.
Figure 20
Illinois Monument
Next Tour Stop #2 at the Shirley House
There were two main approaches to Vicksburg from Jackson:
The Old Jackson Road coming the Illinois mounument area and
the Baldwin Ferry road coming into the Texas Redoubt positions.
1)
House goes back to first settlers in the area
who moved here after Napoleanic wars, Wexford lodge 1812.
2)
Loess caves (She’Bangs’) dug by Union troops on
the downslope of the other side of the Jackson road hills here
3)
Confederate union sympathisers were called
Unionists, Federal southern sympathizers copperheads
4)
The Unions had sharpshooter’s as the coonskin
tower east of here and the confederates at Ransom’s approach. There is a story
of how Grant wandered into the sights of a confederate sharpshooter and only
saved from being killed because the confederate shooter’s superior heard him
cussing (at Grant who from what he saw was only a unidentified union officer)
and ordered the enlisted man not to shoot because he was cussing at another
officer (even if one on the other side).
“American history changed on this
ground”
Abraham Lincoln’s words are on the
Illinois monument (there are no guns on it), “With malice toward none, let us
have peace”
In 1870, after the war, when there
was a black sheriff of Vicksburg during reconstruction the whites in the city
revolted and organized a rebellion on the house’s grounds. They ambushed and
killed the black sheriff here.
There is the story my mother told
while being a guide of the famous Helen Hayes visiting the park and when she
discovered the excellent acoustics inside, decided to recite all the verses
theatrically
In front of those happening by.
There are 37,000 names on the plaques. The golden eagle symbolizes a victorious
nation. The figurine on the portal is of the Greek God of History Cleo writing
down the roles of the heroes here for immortality, with daughters of the North
and South on each side of here.
Figure 21 Approach to the Louisiania Redoubt, looking
west from the Illinois Monument
Tour Stop 6 On July 1 the Unions blew the redoubt here on
June 24, the confederates counterattacked with mines of their own (34 US Army,
34 confederates killed). The Ransom gun path is named for John Wesley Powell
who became famous after the war explored the Grand Canyon.
You can see the approach to the Louisiana redoubt dug at
angles in order to avoid enfilade fire from the defenders. The union diggers
were from the town of Galena (which means tin mining city). The first row of
attackers shot while the 2nd and 3rd row reloaded.
Springield and Enfiled rifles were used. They had a practical range of 400
yards.
Figure 22
Graveyard Rd., looking towards the Great Redoubt.
Graveyard Road
Sherman Corps leads the Union attacking troops into
Vicksburg concurrently with the battle of the Big Black. On May 18 he fails
miserably with the heaviest losses, and the most bloody battle of the Vicksburg
siege attacks. On May 19 there is another attack on the stockade redan which
fails. Attackers approached in a solid
body 6 deep, sharpshooter’s covered the advance to the extent they could. On
May 22 there is a synchronized attack with a four to five hour artillery
barrage on the railroad redoubt. At 10 AM the assault attack begins
1)
Ewings approach here is perpendicular to the
defender’s redoubt. At 6 AM the first coordinated artillery attack in history
begins with a four to five hour attack of the artillery here and at the
railroad redoubt. There was a moat in front of the confederate defences, with 3
lines of trenches dug, as well as abatis, fascines. The confederate defenders
had also but covered interior lines of communication between the trenches.
During the attack the Union troops are well within the range of the Confederate
Infield rifes Before the battle Sherman ordered some men to take the boards off
the house that Grant had found shelter in, in order to construct scaling
ladders to cross the moat. Grant allowed this after being surprised at what was
happened. Union troops were ordered to run ahead of the other union attackers,
charging up the steep hill, and through themselves down with the wood slats
over the moats. It turned out the wooden ladders were not long enough and they
dies in place. After the 2nd
on the 20thbattle, due to Grant’s decision, the bodies were left on the
field until the 24th.
2)
There is the story of a 14 year old boy trooper
who ran back under fire to Sherman, requesting more ammunition for his unit. He
won the medal of honor for this heroic act.
Figure 23
View to the west and the Port of Vicksburg from Fort Hill.
Fort Hill stop (Actually the
Louisiana Redan was called ‘Fort Hill’ by the troops at that time) . The
Louisiana monument is the high point on the MS river between Memphis and New
Orleans.
In 1866 the Vicksburg Natl
Cemetary was created, volunteers were paid $5 a body to inter the dead in the
cemetery. The figure of 20,000 casulties buried here refers to those
1)killed,2)missing in action,3)absent from duty. Of the 20,000, 17,000 are from the civil war, 13,000 unknown
but died in the Western Theater of the War, of these 4700 were black troops fr
om the area.This is the largest Civil war cemetery in the Western Theater
Figure 24
Cleared fields looking southeast of Texas Monument
Figure 25
Tour Stop 15 Texas Redoubt
The purpose of the redoubt is to protect the Southern
railroad of MS. It guards the Baldwin’s Ferry road into Vicksburg. The big
Union guns up on the opposite pounded the defenders fortifications.
SGT Higgens, the Union flag bearer won the medal of honor
here during the assault. When he reached the confederate trenchs, he discovered
the rest of his unit had already fallen behind him. There were 58 holes in the
flag. The confederate soldiers, amazed at his daring, took him prisoner but did
not take his flag away from him. 3 years later he was awarded the medal on the
testimony from his confederate capturers in the trench about his heroism.
The assault of May 22: If the Union’s beak the Confederate
lines here the game is over. If they can hold the area until Grant reinforces
them they will be able to enter the city. But, the confederat4es are able to
breach the Union lines here and postpone defeat. McClernand has no reserves to
continue the attack (he uses all his troops in the front lines). Grant removes
McClernand from command here after he fails to break through and for helping
some newspapers to publish some of Grant’s orders. But, he does send
reinforcemetns, but he (McClernand who Grant had always considered a political
General and a threat to his success) is replaced by Gen. Ord. During the last
attack Bowen is shot through the heart. (?) After these failed attacks Grant
did not try and attack in the southern part of the battle area as much because
he wanted to let the confederates attack first and then chase them down.
On the statue of the Texas monument the man is out of
uniform with his shirt open. But, the socks tucked in to protect from chiggers
is realistic
During the campaign there were about 20,000 casulties,
during the battle around the city 2 days elapsed with the Union dead lying
where they fell until a truce was finally called in order to negotiate
surrender.
Figure 26
View to the Southeast, through the cleared areas of approach in the attack of
McClernand May 22, from the Texas Redoubt.
Figure 27 View to the East and the IOWA Memorial,
looking from standing on the Texas Redoubt. The frescos on the memorial portray
scenes of Iowans from the battle of Grand Gulf, Port Gibson, Jackson, Big Black
River, Champion Hill, and the assault on Vicksburg.
